Complaint; Filed by: KIRBY VELASCO (Plaintiff); As to: SETA CORPORATION OF BOCA, INC. (Defendant); PALMBEACHJEWELRY.COM, LLC (Defendant) August 26, 2024 (2024)

Preview
1 Evan J. Smith, Esquire (SBN 242352) esmith@brodskysmith.com 2 Ryan P. Cardona, Esquire (SBN 302113) rcardona@brodskysmith.com 3 BRODSKY SMITH 9465 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 300 4 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Telephone: (877) 534-2590 5 Facsimile: (310) 247-0160 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 910 KIRBY VELASCO, CASE NO.:11 Plaintiff, JUDGE:12 vs. DEPT.:13 SETA CORPORATION OF BOCA, COMPLAINT FOR: INC., and14 PLAMBEACHJEWELRY.COM, LLC 1. VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA PENAL D/B/A CODE § 630, et. seq.;15 WWW.PALMBEACHJEWELRY.COM,16 Defendants. 2. VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 638.5117 3. INVASION OF PRIVACY1819 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED2021 Plaintiff Kirby Velasco (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”), through the undersigned counsel, files22 this action against defendants Seta Corporation of Boca, Inc., and PalmBeachJewelry.com, LLC23 d/b/a www.palmbeachjewelry.com (hereinafter “Defendants” or “PalmBeach Jewelry”) and24 alleges upon information and belief, except for those allegations that pertain to her, which are25 alleged upon personal knowledge, as follows:26 INTRODUCTION27 1. To learn the identity of anonymous visitors to www.palmbeachjewelry.com (the28 “Website”) and monetize its knowledge of those visitors and their online habits, Defendants have -1- COMPLAINT 1 secretly deployed spyware that accesses visitor devices, installs tracking software, and surveils 2 their browsing habits. 3 2. Plaintiff visited Defendants’ Website and purchased jewelry being sold by the 4 Defendants. Without being provided notice or Plaintiff’s consent, Defendants secretly used “pen 5 register” and “trap and trace” software (“PR/TT Spyware”), to access Plaintiff’s device and install 6 tracking software in violation of California law. 7 3. Additionally, Defendants also secretly employed third party vendors, to secretly 8 embed portions of computer code (“Session Replay Code”) on the Website. Such code deploys 9 itself on the internet browser of each consumer visiting the Website for the purpose of allowing10 devices and/or processes to intercept and record the visiting consumer’s electronic11 communications with the Website, including their mouse movements, clicks, keystrokes (such as12 text being entered into an information field or text box), URLs of web pages visited, and/or other13 electronic communications in real-time (“Website Communications”). Third-party vendors, create14 and deploy Session Replay Code on the Website at PalmBeach Jewelry’s request.15 4. Defendants’ unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practices of installing such software to16 improperly utilize Plaintiff’s and other California consumers’ data in order to gain monetary17 advantages has resulted in numerous violations of privacy against such persons.18 5. As such Plaintiff brings the instant action seeking statutory damages, punitive19 damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney’s fees and costs, and other appropriate relief.20 JURISDICATION AND VENUE21 6. Defendants are subject to jurisdiction in this state under Cal. Penal Code section22 502(j) which provides that a person who accesses a computer from another jurisdiction is deemed23 to have personally accessed the computer in California. Plaintiff was in California when24 Defendants accessed Plaintiff’s device and installed tacking code.25 7. Additionally, Plaintiff utilized the Website to purchased Flexible Herringbone26 Necklace in Sterling Silver 18” Length for a total cost of $131.20 (the “Products”) from Defendants27 via the Website on August 23, 2024. Defendants sold and thereafter shipped said Product into28 California to Plaintiff. -2- COMPLAINT 1 8. Jurisdiction is also proper as Defendants purposefully availed themselves to the 2 jurisdiction by shipping consumer goods to Plaintiff who resides in the jurisdiction. 3 9. Venue is proper in this County because Plaintiff resides in this County and the 4 actions giving rise to the allegations contained herein occurred in this County. 5 THE PARTIES 6 10. Plaintiff is a resident of California. 7 11. Seta Corporation of Boca, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation with its principal address 8 at 6400 East Rogers Circle, Boca Raton, FL 33499. 9 12. PalmBeachJewelry.com, LLC d/b/a www.palmbeachjewelry.com is a Florida10 Limited Liability Company with its principal address at 6400 East Rogers Circle, Boca Raton, FL11 33499.12 13. To Plaintiff’s belief and knowledge PalmBeachJewelry.com, LLC d/b/a13 www.palmbeachjewelry.com is a wholly owned subsidiary, or otherwise an affiliate of, Seta14 Corporation of Boca, Inc.15 14. To Plaintiff’s belief and knowledge Defendants own and/or operate the Website to16 sell goods to consumers in California, amongst other locales.17 SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS18 A. The California Invasion of Privacy Act19 15. The California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 630 et seq., is20 explicitly intended to protect certain privacy rights of California citizens, with the California21 Legislature expressly recognized that “the development of new devices and techniques for the22 purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications … has created a serious threat to the free23 exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society.” Cal. Penal24 Code § 630.25 16. CIPA proscribes any “person” from “install[ing] or us[ing] a pen register or a trap26 and trace device without first obtaining a court order.” Cal. Penal Code § 638.51(a)27 17. The act goes on to define a “pen register” as a “device or process that records or28 decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or -3- COMPLAINT 1 facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a 2 communication.” Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b). 3 18. Furthermore, a “trap and trace device” is defined as “a device or process that 4 captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other 5 dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a 6 wire or electronic communication, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code § 7 638.50(b). 8 19. To put simply, a “pen register” is a “device or process” that records outgoing 9 information, whereas a “trap and trace device” is a “device or process” that records incoming10 information. A “pen register” and “trap and trace device” are collectively referred to herein as11 “PenTraps” or “PR/TT”, and the offending software complained of herein as “PR/TT Spyware”.12 20. Historically, law enforcement used “pen registers” to record the numbers of13 outgoing calls from a particular telephone line, while law enforcement used “trap and trace14 devices” to record the numbers of incoming calls to that particular telephone line. As technology15 advanced, however, courts have expanded the application of those surveillance devices consistent16 with changes in both federal and state law.17 21. For example, with the passage of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, the Pen-Trap18 definition was expanded to include a device or process to keep up with the advancement and19 evolution of Internet technologies and communications. In 2015, the California Legislature20 overwhelmingly adopted this updated and expanded definition without a single vote in opposition.21 See Stats. 2015, ch. 204, § 1 (A.B. 929) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016); see also In re Order Authorizing22 Prospective & Continuous Release of Cell Site Location Recs., 31 F. Supp. 3d 889, 898 n.46 (S.D.23 Tex. 2014) (citing Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the24 Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 949, 982-89 (1996) (describing the evolution of PR/TT25 technology from mechanical device to computer system)).26 22. For example, if a user sends an email, a “pen register” might record the email27 address it was sent from, the email address that the email was sent to, and the subject line—because28 this is the user’s outgoing information. On the other hand, if the same user receives an email, a -4- COMPLAINT 1 “trap and trace device” might record the email address it was sent from, the email address it was 2 sent to, and the subject line—because this is incoming information that is being sent to that same 3 user. 4 23. Although CIPA was enacted before the dawn of the Internet, “the California 5 Supreme Court regularly reads statutes to apply to new technologies when such a reading would 6 not conflict with the statutory scheme.” In re Google Inc., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 7 5423918, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013); see also, Greenley v. Kochava, No. 22-cv-01327- 8 BAS-AHG, - F. Supp. 3d -, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2023) (referencing 9 CIPA’s “expansive language” when finding software was a “pen register”); Javier v. Assurance10 IQ, LLC, 2022 WL 1744107, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31, 2022) (“Though written in terms of11 wiretapping, [CIPA] Section 631(a) applies to Internet communications.”). This accords with the12 fact that “when faced with two possible interpretations of CIPA, the California Supreme Court has13 construed CIPA in accordance with the interpretation that provides the greatest privacy14 protection.” Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2016 WL 8200619, at *19 (N.D.15 Cal. Aug. 12, 2016).16 24. Additionally, CIPA proscribes any person from aiding and abetting the invasion of17 privacy by third parties. Specifically, Cal. Penal Code § 631(a), a plaintiff need only establish that18 a defendant, “by means of any machine, instrument, contrivance, or in any other manner” does any19 of the following:20 Intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically,21 electrically, acoustically, inductively or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone22 wire, line, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system,23 Or24 Willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any25 unauthorized manner, reads or attempts to read or learn the contents or meaning of26 any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over27 any wire, line or cable or is being sent from or received at any place within the state,28 Or -5- COMPLAINT 1 Uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in 2 any way, any information so obtained, 3 Or 4 Aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully 5 do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this 6 section. 7 Cal. Penal. Code § 631(a). 8 25. Notably, Section 631(a) is not limited to phone lines, but also applies to “new 9 technologies” such as computers, the Internet, and email. See, Matera v. Google Inc., 2016 WL10 8200619, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (CIPA applies to “new technologies” and must be11 construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose of protecting privacy); Bradley v. Google,12 Inc., 2006 WL 3798134, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) (CIPA governs “electronic13 communications”); In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, --- F.3d --- 2020 WL14 1807978 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020) (reversing dismissal of CIPA and common law privacy claims15 based on Facebook’s collection of consumers’ Internet browsing history).16 26. Session Replay Code, allowing third parties to surreptitiously intercept17 communications of users to the Website, clearly falls into the above categories of conduct CIPA18 is designed to curtail.19 B. PR/TT Spyware and Session Replay Code are Utilized to De-Anonymize Otherwise20 Anonymous Website Visitors and Track and Surveil Such Users.21 27. Individuals who use devices to connect to an Internet website are typically22 anonymous and expect to remain anonymous. However, certain website operators, in an effort to23 monetize the personally identifiable information (“PII”) of individuals accessing their websites,24 secretly attach a “tracking beacon” to visitor devices that are then used to track and surveil users25 in.26 28. The tracking software will connect fragments of information – such as a unique IP27 address, user’s operating system name, operating system version number, browser name, browser28 version number, browser language, screen resolution, geolocation data, email address, mobile ad -6- COMPLAINT 1 IDs, embedded social media identities, customer and/or loyalty IDs, cookies and device signature 2 – with connections between them. The tracking software also connects and correlates “undeclared 3 identifiers,” such as membership in an email or subscriber list, demographics, 4 purchases/transactions, visits to online news sites, survey results, voter registration, and motor 5 vehicle records. 6 29. Using tracking software, a website owner can correlate a grouping of fragments and 7 the connections between them to create a unique digital profile of each individual website visitor. 8 This process is known as “digital fingerprinting.” 9 30. If a website owner can link a unique digital profile created by digital fingerprinting10 to a particular individual, the website owner can assemble a detailed picture of a person’s private11 life, including: the online services for which an individual has registered; personal interests based12 on websites visited; organizational affiliations; where the individual has been physically; a13 person’s political and religious affiliations; individuals with whom they have leanings and with14 whom they associate; and where they travel, among other things. See,15 https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-anddecisions/research/explore-privacy-16 research/2013/ip_201305/.17 31. Digital fingerprinting of a website’s users allows the website owner or its agent to18 monitor user activity (such as page views, searches, or purchases), de-codes the device used by19 each website visitor, and enables a website to identify the location, race, age, preferences, internet20 browsing history, and ethnicity of each user. This data is captured and processed for the purpose21 of identifying the source of electronic communications on the website for consumer identification22 purposes.23 32. For the preceding reasons, the ability to link a unique digital profile to a specific24 individual using digital fingerprinting is of great monetary value. Indeed, it has created an entire25 industry known as “identity resolution.” Identity resolution is generally defined as “the ability to26 recognize an individual person, in real-time, by connecting various identifiers from their digital27 interactions across devices and touchpoints.” See https://www.fullcontact.com/identity-28 resolution/. -7- COMPLAINT 1 33. One way a website owner can gather digital fingerprints as part of its identity 2 resolution efforts is by deploying PR/TT Spyware on its website. 3 34. PR/TT Spyware captures electronic impulses that identify the originating source of 4 Internet communication by capturing routing, address, or signaling information. 5 35. Similarly, Session Replay Code enables website operators and Session Replay 6 providers to intercept, record, save, and replay website visitors’ interactions with a given website. 7 36. This is accomplished by the Session Replay provider, inserting the Session Replay 8 Code into the various event handling routines that web browsers use to receive input from users, 9 thus intercepting the occurrence of actions the user takes. When a website delivers Session Replay10 Code to a user’s browser, the code waits and listens for specified events and communications, like11 a traditionally tapped phone, and each time an event triggers the code the browser will follow the12 code’s instructions by sending responses in the form of “event” data to a designated third-party13 server. Typically, the server receiving the event data is controlled by the third-party entity that14 wrote the Session Replay Code, rather than the owner of the website where the code is installed.15 37. The types of events captured by Session Replay Code vary by specific product and16 configuration, but in general are wide-ranging and can encompass virtually every user action,17 including all mouse movements, clicks, scrolls, zooms, window resizes, keystrokes, text entry, and18 numerous other forms of a user’s navigation and interaction through the website. In order to permit19 a reconstruction of a user’s visit accurately, the Session Replay Code must be capable of capturing20 these events at hyper-frequent intervals, often just milliseconds apart. Events are typically21 accumulated and transmitted in blocks periodically throughout the user’s website session, rather22 than after the user’s visit to the website is completely finished.23 38. Once such data is captured by the Session Replay Code, the third party Session24 Replay provider is able to store such data and replay it, similarly to running back a video, to25 carefully analyze all inputs, keystrokes, and other data input by the user onto a website utilizing26 such Session Replay Code.27 39. Session Replay Code is likely to even capture information that a user did not intend28 to provide to the website utilizing such code. For example, a consumer who entered the banking -8- COMPLAINT 1 details of their VISA card into a payment field on a website utilizing Session Replay Code when 2 they meant to provide similar details for their American Express card will have unknowingly 3 provided details for both to the Session Replay provider – the Session Replay Code captures all 4 keystrokes made on the website regardless of whether a completed form is submitted by the user. 5 40. Session Replay Code also is highly likely to de-anonymize all users on the Website, 6 as it will necessarily capture any and all information submitted to the Website for purchase and 7 shipping details, including a user’s e-mail address, phone number, physical address, name, etc. 8 41. The PII that can be captured by Session Replay Code is likely to include highly 9 private and sensitive information including credit card details, medical information, and password10 information, amongst other things.11 COUNT I12 (For Violations of CIPA, Cal. Penal Code § 638.51)13 42. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in all other paragraphs as though14 fully set forth herein.15 43. Section 638.51 of Cal. Penal Code provides that it is illegal to “install or use a pen16 register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order pursuant to Section 638.5217 or 638.53.” Cal. Penal Code § 638.51(a). A “‘Pen register’ means a device or process that records18 or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or19 facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a20 communication. Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b).21 44. The Defendants deployed illegal PR/TT by placing Spyware website22 cookies/beacons on the Plaintiff’s device.23 45. The PR/TT allowed Defendants to knowingly and criminally access Plaintiff’s24 device, and obtain Plaintiff’s personal information including, inter alia, Plaintiff’s IP address.25 46. The Defendants deployed the PR/TT without providing privacy tracking or cookie26 disclaimers or notifications thru popups, modals, dialogs, or banners. Plaintiff did not consent to27 Defendants’ actions.28 -9- COMPLAINT 1 47. Plaintiff suffered both an economic injury and an intangible injury to Plaintiff’s 2 caused by the violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy. 3 48. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $5,000. See, Cal. Penal Code § 4 637.2(a)(1). 5 49. Plaintiff further seeks, as provided under CIPA, injunctive relief to require the 6 Defendants to cease the offending conduct, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and all other 7 relief that is necessary, just, proper, and appropriate. 8 COUNT II 9 (For Violations of CIPA, Cal. Penal Code § 630 et seq.)10 50. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in all other paragraphs as though11 fully set forth herein.12 51. CIPA proscribes any person from aiding and abetting the invasion of privacy by13 third parties. Specifically, Cal. Penal Code § 631(a), a plaintiff need only establish that a14 defendant, “by means of any machine, instrument, contrivance, or in any other manner” does any15 of the following:16 Intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically,17 electrically, acoustically, inductively or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone18 wire, line, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system,19 Or20 Willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any21 unauthorized manner, reads or attempts to read or learn the contents or meaning of22 any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over23 any wire, line or cable or is being sent from or received at any place within the state,24 Or25 Uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in26 any way, any information so obtained,27 Or28 - 10 - COMPLAINT 1 Aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully 2 do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this 3 section. 4 Cal. Penal. Code § 631(a). 5 52. Defendants aided and abetted third party Session Replay code providers to intercept 6 components of Plaintiff’s private electronic communications and transmissions when Plaintiff 7 accessed the Website from within the State of California. 8 53. At all relevant times, Defendants’ business practices of injection Session Replay 9 Code allowed third parties unauthorized by Plaintiff to access, intercept, learn the contents of, and10 collect Plaintiff’s substantive communications, PII, and other data. This included Plaintiff’s11 sensitive information including credit card information that was entered at the time of Plaintiff’s12 purchase.13 54. By using the “Session Replay Code” spyware to allow others to track, record, and14 attempt to learn the contents of Plaintiff’s electronic communications, Defendants knowingly and15 intentionally aided and abetted others to tap and learn the contents of Plaintiff’s communications16 as they were in transit and being sent from or received in California.17 55. Plaintiff has an objective, reasonable expectation of privacy in her Website18 Communications. The Defendants deployed the Session Replay Code spyware without providing19 privacy tracking or cookie disclaimers or notifications thru popups, modals, dialogs, or banners20 56. Plaintiff did not consent to, nor authorize Defendants’ intrusion at the time it21 occurred. Plaintiff never agreed that Defendants could disclose the content of her Website22 Communications or credit card information to third parties.23 57. Plaintiff has an objective interest in precluding the dissemination and/or misuse of24 her information and communications and in conducting her personal activities without intrusion25 or interference, including the right to not have her personal information intercepted and utilized26 for business gain.27 58. Plaintiff suffered both an economic injury and an intangible injury caused by the28 violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy. - 11 - COMPLAINT 1 59. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $5,000. See, Cal. Penal Code § 2 637.2(a)(1). 3 60. Plaintiff further seeks, as provided under CIPA, injunctive relief to require the 4 Defendants to cease the offending conduct, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, and all other 5 relief that is necessary, just, proper, and appropriate. 6 COUNT III 7 (For Invasion of Privacy) 8 61. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in all other paragraphs as though 9 fully set forth herein.10 62. The California Constitution recognizes the right to privacy inherent in all residents11 of the State and creates a private right of action against private entities that invade that right.12 63. Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “All people are by13 nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending14 life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,15 happiness, and privacy.”16 64. The right to privacy was added to the California Constitution in 1972, through17 Proposition 11 (called the “Right to Privacy Initiative”). Proposition 11 was designed to codify18 the right to privacy, protecting individuals from invasions of privacy from both the government19 and private entities alike: “The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and20 compelling interest. . . . It prevents government and business interests from collecting and21 stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing information gathered for one22 purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us. Fundamental to our privacy is the23 ability to control circulation of personal information.” Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats. and Amends.24 to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972), argument in favor of Prop. 11,25 p. 27; see also, Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (the right to privacy includes right to26 be free in one’s home from unwanted communication); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.27 (1994), 7 Cal.4th 1, 81, (Mosk, J., dissenting).28 - 12 - COMPLAINT 1 65. Plaintiff has a legally protected privacy interests, as recognized by the California 2 Constitution, CIPA, and common law. 3 66. Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circ*mstances, as they 4 could not have reasonably expected that Defendants would violate state privacy laws and would 5 install software on their personal computer and/or mobile device that would track and transmit 6 their physical location and communications and share Plaintiff’s PII with other parties. 7 67. Defendants’ conduct violates, at a minimum: 8 a. The right to privacy in data, communications and personal information 9 contained on personal devices;10 b. The California Constitution, Article I, Section 1;11 c. The California Wiretapping Act;12 d. The California Invasion of Privacy Act; and13 e. The California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act.14 68. Defendants’ conduct in secretly intercepting and collecting Plaintiff’s PII, location15 data, and communications is an egregious breach of societal norms and is highly offensive to a16 reasonable person.17 69. Defendants’ conduct in analyzing, using, and sharing with third parties the personal18 information and communications that Defendants intercepted and took from Plaintiff is an19 egregious breach of societal norms and is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and violates20 Plaintiff’s reasonable expectations of privacy.21 70. Plaintiff did not consent for Defendants to track, collect, or use their personal22 information and communications.23 71. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ invasions of their privacy, Plaintiff24 was injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief and just compensation in25 an amount to be determined at trial.26 72. By knowingly violating Plaintiff’s privacy and illegally accessing Plaintiff’s device27 to install tracking software, Defendants acted with oppression and malice. As such, Defendants28 are liable for punitive damages. - 13 - COMPLAINT 1 73. Defendants were unjustly enriched as a result of its invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy. 2 74. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive relief to require the Defendants to cease the 3 offending conduct. 4 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 5 WHERFORE, Plaintiff prays for and demands judgment against Defendants and requests 6 the following relief: 7 A. That this Court order Defendants to cease the violations of CIPA and the invasion 8 of Plaintiff’s privacy through its acts on the Website; 9 B. That this Court issue an Order requiring Defendants to pay statutory damages,10 punitive damages, and attorney’s fees;11 C. For prejudgment interest to the extent allowed by law;12 D. For costs of suit incurred herein; and13 E. That this Court award such other and further relief as it deems necessary, just,14 proper, and appropriate.15 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL16 Plaintiff hereby demands a jury on all issues which can be heard by a jury.17 Dated: August 26, 2024 BRODSKY SMITH1819 Evan J. Smith By:_____________________________ Evan J. Smith (SBN242352)20 esmith@brodskysmith.com Ryan P. Cardona, Esquire (SBN 302113)21 rcardona@brodskysmith.com 9465 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 30022 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Telephone: (877) 534-259023 Facsimile: (310) 247-016024 Attorneys for Plaintiff25262728 - 14 - COMPLAINT

Related Contentin Los Angeles County

Case

GARNIK DAVTYAN, ET AL. VS ALEXEY KOSOBOUTSKY

Aug 19, 2024 |Gary I. Micon |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24CHCV02962

Case

REYES VILLEGAS CARILLO VS AIDARBEK R AZYKBEKOV, ET AL.

Aug 19, 2024 |Eric P. Harmon |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24VECV03962

Case

KAMRAN DEHDASHTINEJAD VS LURIE PHYSICAL THERAPY, P.C., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |Eric P. Harmon |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24VECV03989

Case

MONICA SANCHEZ VS MAINE EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Aug 19, 2024 |Daniel M. Crowley |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV20974

Case

EDWIN GONZALEZ MEJIA, ET AL. VS TYLER JOSEPH ROUSSEAU, ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |Sarah J. Heidel |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24NNCV03731

Case

RAYA MILORO VS COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 19, 2024 |Huey P. Cotton, Jr. |Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |24VECV03977

Case

ANGEL CASTILLO VS JOSE ANAYA, ET AL.

Aug 23, 2024 |Daniel M. Crowley |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV21493

Case

JAZMIN ROSALES, ET AL. VS JOSE PONCE MALDONADO

Aug 19, 2024 |Fumiko Hachiya Wasserman |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24CMCV01256

Case

EDGAR LOPEZ SANCHEZ VS ACE OF HEARTS, INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION

Aug 22, 2024 |Steve Cochran |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV21372

Ruling

YAROSLAVA VORONKOV, ET AL. VS LITTLE BEE DAY CARE, INC., ET AL.

Aug 19, 2024 |22STCV20016

Case Number: 22STCV20016 Hearing Date: August 19, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: August 19, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV20016 MOTIONS: Petition for Expedited Minors Compromise MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Daria Lukonina OPPOSING PARTY: Unopposed The Court has reviewed the Expedited Petition to Approve Compromise of Pending Action of a Minor filed on July 16, 2024 by Petitioner Daria Lukonina (Petitioner) on behalf of Claimant Yaroslava Voronkov, age 4. The Court does not approve and denies the petition based on the following reasons: As an initial matter, Petitioner is the appointed guardian ad litem. Petitioner claims $3,688 in medical expenses to be reimbursed but does not show who will receive the reimbursem*nt in item 13. Since Petitioner asserts no expenses were paid by Medicare or Medi-Cal, then Petitioner must mark/complete 13dg (whichever are applicable). Attachment 8 appears to suggest that the reimbursem*nt will be paid to The Rawlings Company LLC. If the reimbursem*nt will be paid to a health insurance plan, Petitioner must complete item 13d. Petitioner must include attachment 13a identifying each medical expense payer and the amount each paid, and explaining any differences in items 13a(1), (4), and (5). Petitioner request $2,000 in attorney fees which represents 20% of the gross settlement. However, Petitioner must include an attorney declaration explaining the basis for the request and describing the factors in California Rules of Court, rule 7.955(b) and a copy of the fee agreement in attachment 14a. Petitioner must include attachment 18a. Petitioner cannot mark both 19a and 19b. If there is no guardianship of the estate (unrelated to a guardian ad litem), then a subsection in 19b should be selected, along with any applicable attachment requested on the form. Petitioner must complete and file a proposed order (MC-351) and, if a blocked account is sought in 19b2, an order for blocked account (MC-355). Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

RALPH KESTING VS CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Aug 22, 2024 |22STCV37748

Case Number: 22STCV37748 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Dept: 34 The Request to Dismiss Petition to Confirm Contractual Arbitration Award is GRANTED. The Petition to Confirm Contractual Arbitration Award and the associated proceedings are DISMISSED. BACKGROUND: On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff Ralph Kesting filed his Complaint against Defendant Charter Communications, Inc. on causes of action of violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and invasion of privacy. On January 26, 2023, pursuant to the Parties Stipulation, the court submitted this matter to binding arbitration. On April 25, 2024, the Arbitrator issued a Final Award in this matter. On or about May 29, 2024, Defendant paid Plaintiff the full amount of the Final Award. On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed Judicial Council Form ADR-106, Petition to Confirm Contractual Arbitration Award (Petition). In support of his Petition, Plaintiff concurrently filed: (1) Points and Authorities; (2) Declaration of Jeremy S. Golden; (3) Proposed Judgment; and (4) Proof of Service. On June 10, 2024, Defendant filed its Opposition to the Petition. Defendants Opposition includes a request to dismiss the Petition. On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Reply in support of the Petition. Plaintiff concurrently filed his Proof of Service. ANALYSIS: Legal Standard Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) A petition under this chapter shall: (a) Set forth the substance of or have attached a copy of the agreement to arbitrate unless the petitioner denies the existence of such an agreement. (b) Set forth names of the arbitrators. (c) Set forth or have attached a copy of the award and the written opinion of the arbitrators, if any. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.4, subds. (a)(c).) If a petition or response under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.) If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith. The judgment so entered has the same force and effect as, and is subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in a civil action of the same jurisdictional classification; and it may be enforced like any other judgment of the court in which it is entered, in an action of the same jurisdictional classification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4.) Discussion We begin with the premise that courts will not render opinions on moot questions. (Watkins v. Wachovia Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1588, citation omitted.) Here, it is undisputed that the Arbitrator issued a Final Award in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the total amount of $61,193.50. (Decl. Golden, Exh. 3, pp. 3031 [emphasis added].) The Final Award was in full resolution of all of the Parties claims submitted in the arbitration, and the Arbitrator clearly noted that [a]ll claims not expressly granted herein are denied. (Id. at p. 31.) It is also undisputed that on or about May 29, 2024 (which was after the Final Award was issued but before the Petition was filed), Defendant fully paid Plaintiff the award amount of $61,193.50. (Points & Authorities, p. 3:11; Decl. Golden, ¶ 8; Opposition, p. 1:2426 [emphasis added].) Thus, there is no controversy left for the court to adjudicate. Plaintiff has litigated all of his claims, and Defendant has paid all of its liabilities. Yet Plaintiffs Counsel still petitions the Court to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment, claiming [t]he mere fact a defendant has satisfied its obligation does not divest the court of authority to confirm the award. (Points & Authorities, p. 3:1622.) Defense Counsel disagrees, arguing that the Petition is wholly unnecessary and that [c]onfirmation of the [Final] Award is not mandatory in California. (Opposition, pp. 1:24, 2:24; see Cal. Civ. Proc., § 1286.) Defense Counsel then requests that the court deny the Petition and dismiss the proceeding instead of entering judgment on the Final Award. (Id. at p. 3:29.) In his Reply, Plaintiffs Counsel argues that the courts only option is to confirm the Final Award. (Reply, p. 1:2327.) Plaintiff comes to this argument through citations to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1285, 1286, and 1287.2, and 1287.4. (Id. at pp. 1:232:20.) Of note, Plaintiffs Counsel omits any mention of Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.2, cites non-binding case law from other jurisdictions, and argues that Defense Counsel is the one misconstruing the law. (Id. at pp. 1:28, 2:2126.) The court agrees with Defense Counsels reading of the law. Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) A response to a petition under this chapter may request the court to dismiss the petition or to confirm, correct or vacate the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.2.) If a petition or response under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.) The court shall dismiss the proceeding under this chapter as to any person named as a respondent if the court determines that such person was not bound by the arbitration award and was not a party to the arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.2.) As applied here, these sections mean that Plaintiff is allowed to file his Petition, Defendant is allowed to request its dismissal, and the court need not confirm the award if it dismisses the proceedings. Furthermore, the language used in Code of Civil Procedure section 1287.2 does not indicate that there is only one ground for a dismissal in accordance with the chapter. Rather, taken in the context of the chapter as a whole, Code of Civil Procedure section 1287.2 appears to be just one mandatory provision regarding dismissal. This reading is confirmed by repeated opinions from our Courts of Appeal. For example, as one panel recently stated: The court must dismiss the proceeding as to respondent if the court determines the person was not bound by the arbitration award and was not a party to the arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.2.) Courts have suggested additional circ*mstances exist that would allow the court to dismiss the proceeding. (Karton, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 8, fn. 12 [stating in dicta that other procedural bases may exist for dismissal of a proceeding, such as when a petition is filed after the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Code Civ. Proc., § 1288, a party to a nonbinding arbitration award filed a timely request for trial de novo, or any procedural basis that would justify dismissal of any other civil action]; Cinel v. Christopher, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 [dismissal was proper when there was no award within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 1283.4]; Maplebear, Inc. v. Busick (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 394, 399401 [237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98] [concluding from case law that Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.2 does not contain exclusive grounds for dismissal of proceeding].) (Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1086, footnote omitted.) The final question is whether dismissal is appropriate here. In the event of satisfaction [of an arbitration award], judicial relief will not be necessary, conserving court resources. (Eternity Invs., Inc. v. Brown (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 739, 746.) As the Final Award has been satisfied, the Petition is moot and there is no need for further proceedings. Thus, dismissal of the Petition and the associated proceedings is both completely appropriate and in accordance with basic judicial principles. Conclusion[1] The Request to Dismiss Petition to Confirm Contractual Arbitration Award is GRANTED. The Petition to Confirm Contractual Arbitration Award and the associated proceedings are DISMISSED. [1] At the hearing, the court will inquire of the parties whether Lew-Williams v. Petrosian (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 97 prevents the court from dismissing the action.

Ruling

ISAAC PEREZ, ET AL. VS KEPPEL UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |22AVCV00681

Case Number: 22AVCV00681 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This action arises from an injury that occurred on March 02, 2022. Minor Claimant Isaac Perez, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Evelia Montano (Minor Claimant) alleges that he was participating in Defendant Community Building Institute Middletown, Inc. (Middletown)s RISE Student Care Program on Defendant Keppel Union School District (KUSD)s premises when he suffered a fall and fracture to his ankle because his foot got stuck in the rubber padding beneath the swing set which was in a state of disrepair. On September 07, 2022, Minor Claimant filed a complaint against Defendants KUSD and Middletown alleging two causes of action for: (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property, and (2) Negligence. On October 13, 2022, KUSD filed its Answer. On February 14, 2023, Minor Claimant amended the fictitious name of Doe 1 to Rise After School Programs, LLC and dismissed Middletown only. On July 07, 2023, Plaintiff amended the fictitious name of Doe 2 to Rodriguez Instructional Systems Enter dba RISE Educational Services and dismissed Rise After School Programs only. On August 08, 2023, Rodriguez Instructional System Enterprises (RISE), erroneously sued as Rodriguez Instructional Systems Enter dba RISE Educational Services (RISE), filed its Answer. On April 23, 2024, Minor Claimant filed a Notice of Settlement. On April 23, 2024, after Minor Claimants filing, the Court (1) advanced and vacated the jury trial scheduled for May 17, 2024 and the Final Status Conference scheduled for may 08, 2024; and (2) set an Order to Show Cause Re: Submission of Minor's Compromise for June 24, 2024 at 8:30 am in Department A14 at Michael Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse. On June 18, 2024, Petitioner Evelia Montano (Petitioner) filed a petition to approve the compromise of pending action on behalf of Minor Claimant. Analysis Standard for Approving Minors Compromises Court approval is required for all settlements of a minors claim or that of a person lacking the capacity to make decisions. (Prob. Code, §§ 2504, 3500, 3600 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc., § 372; see Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337.) [T]he protective role the court generally assumes in cases involving minors, [is] a role to assure that whatever is done is in the minors best interests . . . . [I]ts primary concern is whether the compromise is sufficient to provide for the minors injuries, care and treatment. (Goldberg v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382.) A petition for court approval of a compromise or covenant not to sue under Code of Civil Procedure section 372 must comply with California Rules of Court Rules 7.950, 7.951, and 7.952. The petition must be verified by the petitioner and contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise or the covenant. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.) The person compromising the claim on behalf of the minor or person who lacks capacity, and the represented person, must attend the hearing on compromise of the claim unless the court for good cause dispenses with their personal appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.952(a).) An order for deposit of funds of a minor or person lacking decision-making capacity and a petition for the withdrawal of such funds must comply with California Rules of Court Rules 7.953 and 7.954. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1384; see also Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rules 4.115-4.118.) ----- The petition shows that Minor Claimant settled with KUSD for $40,000.00 and RISE for $60,000.00, bringing the total amounts of settlement proceeds to $100,000.00. $5,624.81 will be used to pay medical expenses, $35,000 will be used to pay attorneys fees, and $5,658.26 will be used to pay non-medical expenses, leaving a balance of $53,716.93. Petitioner proposes the net proceed be deposited into a blocked account on behalf of Minor Claimant. The Court finds the settlement fair and reasonable. The Court finds issue with Item Number 13(b). It appears that costs that are not allowed under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5 have been included. First, Petitioner lists an expert retainer to Aperture, LLC in the amount of $2,864.37. Only [f]ees of expert witnesses ordered by the court are expressly allowed under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(8). Aperture, LLC is not an expert witness ordered by the Court. Next, while the Court can make a reasonable inference that the deposition transcript of Plaintiff was necessary, Petitioner has included another cost titled deposition transcripts. (See Petition 13(b) [fifth item states Deposition Transcripts to Planet Depos].) Taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party against whom costs are allowed. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(3)(A).) No attachment or information has been provided for this item. The Court cannot determine what the deposition transcripts are for and, if applicable, whether the transcripts were necessary. Petitioner has also attempted to recover costs of certified mailing paid to the U.S. Post Office. Postage, telephone, and photocopying charges, except for exhibits are expressly disallowed as costs under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(b)(3), except when expressly authorized by law. Petitioner has not presented authority to allow postage costs. Likewise, Petitioner requests $30.00 for medical records. Investigation expenses in preparing the case for trial are expressly disallowed as costs under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(b)(2), except when expressly authorized by law and Petitioner has not presented authority to allow medical records. Petitioner has not presented that any items in this Petition that the Court takes issue with fall under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(4). As to attorney fees, Petitioner directs the Court to Attachment 13a in which it is presented that a retainer agreement was signed between Minor Claimants Guardian ad Litem, Petitioner. (See Attachment 13a at ¶ 9.) However, Attachment 17a shows a document that is signed by Petitioner, but not Custodio & Dubey LLP either through Miguel A. Custodio Jr., Esq., whose name is on the signature line for the document, or Nathaniel Clark, Minor Claimants attorney of record. The Court need not discuss the validity of the attached retainer as Cal. Fam. Code § 6602 provides:¿ ¿ A contract for attorneys fees for services in litigation, made by or on behalf of a minor, is void unless the contract is approved, on petition by an interested person, by the court in which the litigation is pending or by the court having jurisdiction of the guardianship estate of the minor. If the contract is not approved and a judgment is recovered by or on behalf of the minor, the attorneys fees chargeable against the minor shall be fixed by the court rendering the judgment.¿ Cal. Prob. Code § 360(a) gives discretion to the Court for an order authorizing and directing reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees. The factors that a court may consider in determining a reasonable attorneys fee is laid out in Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 7.955(b).¿¿ Attorney fees on a minors compromise are generally 25%. This stems from a previous a previous local rule which stated: Except where good cause is shown, the attorney's fees shall not exceed an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the gross proceeds of settlement, or, if applicable, the amount determined under Business and Professions Code section 6146[, part of MICRA], whichever is less. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, former rule 10.79(c)(3), italics added.) The Court notes that other superior courts in California had similar local rules. Currently, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 7.955(d) contains a preemption clause which states:¿¿ ¿ The Judicial Council has preempted all local rules relating to the determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded from the proceeds of a compromise, settlement, or judgment under Probate Code sections 3600-3601. No trial court, or any division or branch of a trial court, may enact or enforce any local rule concerning this field, except a rule pertaining to the assignment or scheduling of a hearing on a petition or application for court approval or allowance of attorney's fees under sections 3600-3601. All local rules concerning this field are null and void unless otherwise permitted by a statute or a rule in the California Rules of Court.¿ ¿ The Court is not persuaded by counsel for Petitioner Nathaniel Clark (Clark)s presentation that this case is novel or difficult. Clark concedes . . . children breaking a bone while playing outside is not an extremely rare occurrence. (Attachment 13a, ¶ 48(3). A government claim is also not novel. (See id., ¶ 48(5).) Many personal injury attorneys face claims that involve a government claim. Clark does not provide insight regarding his own experience, reputation and/or ability. (See id. at ¶ 48(7) and ¶ 48(10).) The Court notes that the initial filings included both Devon M. Rios and J. Lloyd Buckleys names. (See Complaint, Civil Case Cover Sheet, Application and Order for GAL.) It is unclear what role or roles Devon M. Rios handled in this case and J. Lloyd Buckley is not mentioned by name. (See Attachment 13a, ¶ 48(7) and ¶ 48(10).) For time and labor, Clark provides . . . Thus, our office was required to depose all of the necessary witnesses, consult with, pay and designate expert witnesses, attend multiple sight inspections, and further prepare the matter for the settlement conference all while maintaining readiness to proceed with trial if necessary. (Id. at ¶ 48(8).) According to Clarks declaration only one sight inspection occurred (see id. at ¶ 33), and three depositions were taken. (See id. at ¶¶ 40, 43.) At this time, expert designation has not occurred in this case as represented in the Courts records. (See also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2034.240 - 2034.260.) The Court notes that the case spanned less than two years and the filings included the Complaint, two Answers, several amendments to Doe names only, and two dismissals. Accordingly, Court finds that the current rate of 35% is not in the best interest of Minor Claimant based on Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 7.955(b) factors. The Court lowers the attorney fees to 30%. Conclusion The Petition to Approve the Compromise of Pending Action on Behalf of Minor Claimant Isaac Perez is GRANTED subject to the following changes: The Court does not allow the following as costs: (1) expert retainer to Aperture, LLC in the amount of $2,864.37; (2) deposition transcripts to Planet Depos in the amount of $1,332.36; (3) certified mailing to the United States Postal Service in the amount of $13.56; and (4) medical records in the amount of $30.00. The Court lowers the requested attorney fees to 30%.

Ruling

YOCHONON BAITELMAN, ET AL. VS JOHN ALPHONSE MARASCO, ET AL.

Aug 20, 2024 |22STCV31294

Case Number: 22STCV31294 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On September 22, 2022, Plaintiffs Yochonon Baitelman and Yochonon Baitelman on behalf of Mushka Baitelman, Rivka Baitelman and Esther Baitelman, minors, filed this action against Defendants John Alphonse Marasco (Marasco), Amie Jennet Morris (Morris), The Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), and Does 1-10 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On March 22, 2024, Morris filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Marasco, LAFD, and Roes 1-10 for indemnity, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault. On August 9, 2024, Defendant City of Los Angeles, acting by and through the Los Angeles Fire Department (City), and Marasco filed an answer to the cross-complaint. On June 7, 2024, Defendants City of Los Angeles, acting by and through the Los Angeles Fire Department (City), and Marasco filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint. On June 27, 2024, the City filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Morris and Roes 1-10 for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief. On June 26, 2024, Morris filed an answer to the Citys cross-complaint. On July 26, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel, Jamie Lefkowitz, filed motions to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs Esther Baitelman and Mushka Baitelman. The motions were set for hearing on August 20, 2024. COUNSELS REQUESTS Plaintiffs counsel, Jamie Lefkowitz, asks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs Esther Baitelman and Mushka Baitelman. LEGAL STANDARD California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362, provides: (a) Notice A notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051). (b) Memorandum Notwithstanding any other rule of court, no memorandum is required to be filed or served with a motion to be relieved as counsel. (c) Declaration The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). (d) Service The notice of motion and motion, the declaration, and the proposed order must be served on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case. The notice may be by personal service, electronic service, or mail. (1) If the notice is served on the client by mail under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, it must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing that either: (A) The service address is the current residence or business address of the client; or (B) The service address is the last known residence or business address of the client and the attorney has been unable to locate a more current address after making reasonable efforts to do so within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. (2) If the notice is served on the client by electronic service under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and rule 2.251, it must be accompanied by a declaration stating that the electronic service address is the client's current electronic service address. As used in this rule, current means that the address was confirmed within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. Merely demonstrating that the notice was sent to the client's last known address and was not returned or no electronic delivery failure message was received is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the address is current. If the service is by mail, Code of Civil Procedure section 1011(b) applies. (e) Order The proposed order relieving counsel must be prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-053) and must be lodged with the court with the moving papers. The order must specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action or proceeding, including the date of trial, if known. If no hearing date is presently scheduled, the court may set one and specify the date in the order. After the order is signed, a copy of the signed order must be served on the client and on all parties that have appeared in the case. The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) DISCUSSION Counsels declarations do not use Judicial Council form MC-052 as California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c), requires. In addition, counsel has not served all the parties that have appeared in this action, as California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d), requires. The Court denies the motions. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice Jamie Lefkowitz's motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Esther Baitelman. The Court DENIES without prejudice Jamie Lefkowitz's motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Mushka Baitelman. Counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Counsel is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Ruling

EDWARD REINA, AN INDIVIDUAL VS LORENA FLAVIA FERRARI, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL.

Aug 23, 2024 |23CHCV00376

Case Number: 23CHCV00376 Hearing Date: August 23, 2024 Dept: F43 Edward Reina vs. Lorena Flavia Ferrari, et al. Trial Date: 8-11-2025 MOTION TO COMPEL INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION MOVING PARTY: Defendants Lorena Flavia Ferrari and Luis D. Jimenez RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Edward Reina RELIEF REQUESTED An order compelling Plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination. RULING: Motion is denied as moot. SUMMARY OF ACTION On June 13, 2024, Defendants Lorena Flavia Ferrari and Luis D. Jimenez (Defendants) filed this motion to compel Plaintiff Edward Reina (Plaintiff) to submit to an independent medical examination. They claimed that it was necessary to file this motion because Plaintiff failed to appear for a previously scheduled examination. Defendants have also requested sanctions. On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants motion. In Plaintiffs opposition he indicated that he did not appear for the previously scheduled examination because he was ill. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants failed to meet and confer before filing this motion. Finally, Plaintiff indicates that this motion is moot because the Defense Medical Exam took place on July 16, 2024. No reply has been filed. Because the examination has taken place and no reply has been filed to indicate otherwise, this motion is denied as moot. No sanctions will be awarded on the motion. Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

HUSAM ASI VS HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION, A CALIFORNIA MUTUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 22, 2024 |22STCV15728

Case Number: 22STCV15728 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING HUSAM ASI, vs. [HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION, et al. Case No.: 22STCV15728 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Plaintiff Husam Asis Motion for Leave to Amend is denied. Plaintiff Husam Asi (Plaintiff) moves for an order granting leave to amend the First Amended Complaint (FAC) to file a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on the grounds that recent developments in the discovery process necessitate the amendment to assert alter ego liability against newly identified defendants Golden Globe Foundation (GGF) and Golden Globes LLC (GG) and to correct and enhance the legal theories and claims against Defendants. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§ 473 and 576.) Background On May 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against HFPA and Non-Moving Defendants Greg Goeckner (Goeckner) and James Lee (Lee) (collectively, Defendants) alleging fourteen causes of action: (1) breach of contract [alleged against HFPA]; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [alleged against HFPA]; (3) tortious breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing [alleged against HFPA]; (4) tortious interference with contractual relations [alleged against HFPA]; (5) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage [alleged against HFPA]; (6) violation of Business & Professions Code §§1700 et seq. [alleged against HFPA]; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress [alleged against HFPA]; (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress [alleged against HFPA]; (9) violation of the California Right of Fair Procedure [alleged against HFPA]; (10) constructive/retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy; (11) sexual harassment in violation of FEHA (hostile work environment); (12) harassment and discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and/or color in violation of FEHA; (13) violation of FEHA- failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; and (14) retaliation for engaging in protected activity. On December 5, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on the HFPAs anti-SLAPP Motion as to the nine causes of action alleged against it. On December 9, 2022, following the hearing, the Court granted the HFPAs anti-SLAPP Motion as to Plaintiffs 8th cause of action, but denied it with respect to the 1st-7th and 9th causes of action, finding that Plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on those claims. On January 25, 2023, the HFPA timely appealed. Following oral argument on October 9, 2023, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion on October 13, 2023 (Appellate Opinion) reversing the Trial Court Order and remanding with instructions to strike Plaintiffs 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th causes of action to the extent they are based on the HFPAs Press Releases. (12/27/23 Remittitur, pg. 33.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, on different grounds, the Trial Court Order solely with respect to Plaintiffs 9th cause of action, concluding that it did not arise out of the HFPAs Press Releases. (12/27/23 Remittitur, pgs. 15-16.) On February 5, 2024, HFPA filed a motion for attorneys fees. On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed his opposition. The Court granted HFPAs motion for attorneys fees in the reduced amount of $322,354.90. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. (Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) Discussion Plaintiff argues that the proposed SAC includes new allegations and parties essential to fully addressing the scope of Defendants actions by adding GGF and GG as defendants under the theory of alter ego liability. (Mot p. 3; Asi Decl. ¶11.) The plaintiff states that his research revealed that GGF and GG are the alter egos of HFPA based on GGF and GG board of directors being HFPA members (Asi Decl. ¶10.) Plaintiff further argues that Defendants would not be disadvantaged by the amendments, as they relate to the original complaint and are based on the same general facts. (Mot. p. 4.) Plaintiff also notes that the September 25, 2025, trial date would provide Defendants with enough time to address the amended claims without incurring significant additional preparation costs. (Id.) However, the motion does not comply with CRC rule 3.1324 because Plaintiff does not provide a copy of his proposed SAC. Rule 3.1324 requires, in addition to a supporting declaration outing the proposed changes, the motion to also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment and (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines of the allegations that would be deleted and added. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) Plaintiff needs to correct these deficiencies by filing a proposed copy of the proposed SAC as well as a red-lined copy indicating the changes to be made. Conclusion Plaintiff Husam Asis Motion for Leave to Amend is denied without prejudice. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: August 22, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

KARLA ARMENTA VS KEMPER ALLIANCE UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY

Aug 22, 2024 |Echo Dawn Ryan |22STCV33958

Case Number: 22STCV33958 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Dept: 26 08/22/2024 Dept. 26 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding ARMENTA v. KEMPER ALLIANCE UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY (22STCV33958) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Karla Armenta (Pro Per) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Mark Israel (Daniels, Fine, Israel, Schonbuch & Lebovits LLP) Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings (filed 03/04/24) TENTATIVE RULING Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff Karla Armenta filed this action against Defendant Alliance United Insurance Company, erroneously sued as Kemper Alliance United Insurance Company. On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging a cause of action for breach of contract against Defendant. Plaintiff alleges she is entitled to damages in the amount of $80,000. On March 4, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (MJOP), arguing: · Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that give rise to any causes of action against Alliance. Specifically, Plaintiff filed Judicial Council Form PLD-C-001 (COMPLAINT Contract) but failed to attach any causes of action to her First Amended Complaint setting forth facts sufficient to put Defendant Alliance on notice of the causes of action alleged against it. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent to a general demurrer. (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) The Court must accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed. (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220.) Courts must consider whether properly pled factual allegationsassumed to be true and liberally construedare sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Com'n (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 116.) B. Request for Judicial Notice Defendant requests judicial notice of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, filed on March 22, 2023. The court may take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States, [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States, and [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) The Court may take judicial notice of its own file. (See Stepan v. Garcia (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 497, 500.) The Court grants Defendants request for judicial notice. C. Meet and Confer Before addressing the merits, the Court notes that the Motion is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 439(a). Defendants counsel states he sent Plaintiff a letter and draft copy of the proposed Motion. (Perez Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendants counsel then had a telephone conference with Plaintiff on February 2, 2024 regarding deficiencies in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, but the parties were unable to reach a resolution. (Perez Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court finds the moving party has satisfied its meet and confer obligation. D. Discussion Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiffs FAC fails to allege any facts that give rise to any causes of action. Here, Plaintiff filed her FAC by filling out Judicial Council Form PLD-C-001 (COMPLAINT Contract). According to section 8 of the FAC, Plaintiff checked the box for breach of contract indicating that she is alleging a cause of action for breach of contract. (FAC, p. 2.) However, Plaintiff did not plead any allegations or facts in support of this cause of action. Plaintiff does not attach a copy of the contract and fails to allege the terms of the contract or how the contract was breached. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. A party who has not timely filed written opposition to a motion&may not be afforded an opportunity to offer oral argument at the hearing. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The failure to file opposition creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is meritorious.¿ (Id.)¿ In such cases, the court may hear argument limited to a request for a continuance of the hearing in order to afford an opportunity for written opposition. (Id.) [T]he rule is patently intended to prevent the introduction of legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court. (Id.) Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Defendants Motion. II. DISPOSITION Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

Ruling

CARMEN AGUILAR VS BLUESTONE LANE COFFEE

Aug 22, 2024 |22SMCV01778

Case Number: 22SMCV01778 Hearing Date: August 22, 2024 Dept: 205 HEARING DATE: August 22, 2024 JUDGE/DEPT: Moreton/Beverly Hills, 205 CASE NAME: Carmen Aguilar v. Bluestone Lane Coffee CASE NUMBER: 22SMCV01778 COMP. FILED: October 7, 2022 PROCEEDINGS: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: Carmen Aguilar RESPONDING PARTY: Bluestone Lane Coffee BACKGROUND This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff Carmen Aguilar was struck on the head by an outdoor umbrella belonging to Defendant Bluestone Lane Coffee. The incident caused serious injuries to Plaintiffs head, neck and right shoulder. She was diagnosed with a concussion and suffered post-traumatic headaches. On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant. The Complaint alleges two claims for general negligence and premises liability. On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Statement of Damages, seeking (1) $1,000,000 for pain, suffering and inconvenience; (2) $500,000 for emotional distress; (3) $50,000 for medical expenses, and (4) $250,000 for future medical expenses. Plaintiff personally served Defendant with the Complaint and Statement of Damages on December 1, 2022. Defendant was obligated to respond. Defendant did not do so. Plaintiff successfully requested the entry of Defendants default, which was entered by the Clerks Office on March 11, 2024. Plaintiff requested a default judgment on March 20, 2024. Plaintiff served Defendant by mail with both the Request for Entry of Default and Request for Default Judgment. Defendant has not appeared. RELIEF REQUESTED Default judgment against Defendant for a total of $514,782.20, which is comprised of: (1) $13,910 in special damages, (2) $500,000 for general damages, and (3) $872.20 for costs. ANALYSIS Code Civ. Proc. § 585 sets forth the two options for obtaining a default judgment. First, where the plaintiffs complaint¿seeks compensatory damages only, in a sum certain which is readily ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint or statement of damages, the clerk may enter the default judgment for that amount. However, if the relief requested in the complaint is more complicated, consisting of either nonmonetary relief, or monetary relief in amounts which require either an accounting, additional evidence, or the exercise of judgment to ascertain, the plaintiff must request entry of judgment by the court. In such cases, the plaintiff must affirmatively establish his entitlement to the specific judgment requested.¿ (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 287.) Section 585 also allows for interest, costs and attorney fees, where otherwise allowed by law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 585(a).) Multiple specific documents are required, such as: (1) form CIV 100, (2) a brief summary of the case; (3) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (4) interest computations as necessary; (5) a memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code Civ. Proc. § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (CRC Rule 3.1800.) Here, there is no declaration to support the claim for $500,000 in general damages, resulting from alleged emotional distress. The sole declaration filed by Plaintiff only addresses the request for $13,910 in special damages (comprising medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff). Plaintiff¿must¿substantiate her claim for¿general¿damages¿with sufficient and admissible evidence including for example, a declaration from a treating physician or if Plaintiffs emotional distress was not treated, a declaration from Plaintiff detailing the existence and extent of her emotional distress. If Plaintiff is unable to¿support¿her allegations, then she must¿reduce the amounts sought accordingly. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs request for default judgment. No later than September 6, 2024, Plaintiff is to submit a new¿default¿judgment package correcting these defects. Failure to do so may result in the imposition of sanctions, including monetary sanctions and/or dismissal. On the Courts own motion, the Order to Show Cause Re: Request for Default Judgment scheduled for August 22, 2024 is continued to September 20, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.

Document

JONATHAN NUNEZ VS MARIA MAGDALENA RIVERA, ET AL.

Aug 14, 2024 |Wendy L. Wilcox |Other Non-Personal Injury/Property Damage tort (General Jurisdiction) |Other Non-Personal Injury/Property Damage tort (General Jurisdiction) |24CMCV01241

Document

GUILLERMO CERVERA VS DOE DEFENDANT 1, ET AL.

May 19, 2021 |Elihu M. Berle |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |21STCV18964

Document

ARMENUHI SHAHBANDARYAN VS WALMART, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 20, 2024 |Ian C. Fusselman |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24NNCV03673

Document

ORLANDO GARCIA VS LLONA L BRANDENBURG, TRUSTEE OF THE BRANDENBURG FAMILY TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 1995, ET AL.

Aug 16, 2024 |Olivia Rosales |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |Civil Rights/Discrimination (General Jurisdiction) |24NWCV02616

Document

JOHN DOE J.C., AN INDIVIDUAL VS DOE 1, A PUBLIC ENTITY

Aug 16, 2024 |Olivia Rosales |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |24NWCV02620

Document

ALEKSANDR BEKKER VS ANA M. DECASTRO

Mar 10, 2020 |William A. Crowfoot |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Other Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |20STCV09683

Document

DENNIS P. BLOCK INDIVIDUALLY VS. JOHN DOE

Sep 05, 2017 |Ralph C. Hofer |civil |Defamation (slander/libel) (General Jurisdiction) |EC067254

Document

CATHY GATEN VS ALL YELLOW TAXI, INC., ET AL.

Mar 09, 2020 |Serena R. Murillo |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |20STCV09542